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Abstract  
Identity is a complicated matter in the religiously diverse Ukraine. Based on long term 
anthropological fieldwork carried out in a village in Odessa province, I explore the 
association between spirituality and identity.  The focus is on the relationship between 
institutionalised religion (namely the Orthodox Church and the priest as its representative) 
and local customs (attributed to the Bulgarian heritage of the population).  The distinction 
between ‘customs’ and ‘religion’ – an emic one to which both villagers and their priest 
subscribe – divides their spiritual loyalties and often creates tensions in the community. Such 
tensions, I suggest, are not a threat to community integrity as much as a means by which 
collective identity is managed. Bi-spirituality provides a means of belonging; contributing to 
the community’s ethnic minority status in an emerging Ukrainian nation-state. 
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Introduction 
The importance of religion in the construction and maintenance of identity has drawn 
considerable attention from anthropologists, amongst other social scientists, working on post-
Socialist Europe.1 The revival of religion has made possible the rebuilding of national 
identities, usually based on mono-religious/ethnic arrangements, in many post-Socialist 
countries. The case of Ukraine, however, is far more complex: various types of Orthodoxy 
compete for prominence, alongside other Christian denominations (including Greek 
Catholicism, Protestantism) as well as Judaism, Islam and other faiths. However, no one 
single confession has a monopoly in this predominantly Orthodox country (Mitrokhin 2001, 
173). National generalisations are thus especially problematic in a country where regional 
diversity, based on religious, ethnic and cultural differences, intersect in complex ways to 
shape identity.  My concern here is with a rural community in Odessa province, where the 
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branch of Orthodoxy that dominates is the Russian Orthodox Church – in line with the rest of 
the region - while at the same time villagers engage with other beliefs and practices that 
provide alternate forms of spirituality.  It is the articulation between institutionalised religion, 
on the one hand, and particular forms of alternate spiritual practices on the other, which 
provides a foundation for local identity.  
The material presented below is based on long-term anthropological fieldwork, 
carried out in a village I call ‘Nagorna’ which lies at the very southern-most part of Odessa 
province in Ukraine, only 40 km from the Danube River - which also constitutes the border 
with Romania - and seven km from the Moldovan border to the west.2  Apart from this 
village, with a population of approximately 3,000, of whom the vast majority claim to be 
ethnic Bulgarians (approximately 94 per cent), there are six other villages in the same 
administrative district, also made up of largely mono-ethnic populations – five Moldovian 
and one Gagauz.3  Reni, the district capital, which lies on the Danube river, is more mixed 
and in addition to large populations of Bulgarians, Moldovans and Gagauz, is also home to 
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, amongst others. The villages in the district, while largely 
mono-ethnic, are – in terms of language – bilingual: Russian is the language spoken across 
ethnic boundaries; while within each village the local ethnic language, be it Bulgarian, 
Romanian or Turkish, is used.4  The diversity of the region – in terms of ethnicity, language 
use and customs – is such that even villages in the area which belong to the same ethnic 
group, often display variations in terms of language and ritual practices that provide a source 
of local differentiation and identity (Kaneff and Heinz 2006, 11).   
 
In the same way that Russian is the language of inter-ethnic communication, so the 
Russian Orthodox Church (henceforth ROC) forms the basis for shared religious activities 
and moral communities between the local populations.5  The 118 Bulgarian families who 
reportedly first settled in Nagorna some two centuries ago6 remain true to the Orthodox 
Church, despite decades of decline and lack of public sponsorship during Soviet times.  The 
Orthodox Church regained its rural prominence in the region in the post-Soviet period and 
while nationally it has splintered into three branches - thus creating an important part of the 
plural religious tapestry of contemporary Ukraine 7 - in Nagorna, as in the rest of the district, 
the community remains loyal to the ROC, renamed as the Ukraine Orthodox Church 
(Moscow Patriarchate), henceforth UOC(MP), which continues to dominate.  
Thus, the Russian language and Russian Orthodox Church (now as the UOC-MP) 
provide a binding force between the villages and ethnicities in the district; while local 
languages and various other customary practices provide distinguishing features between 
them. This is more than just an interesting feature of the region, it is at the heart of tensions 
within the village and provides, I suggest, the key for understanding local identity.   
 
In the first section, I begin with a discussion of bi-spirituality and emphasise that 
despite the acknowledged problems with the concept (e.g. Levin 1993; Rock 2007), the term 
still has some value as a tool that allows us to explore emic articulations of spirituality.  The 
following two sections provide an empirical example: firstly, describing a local village 
3 
 
custom of praying for rain, and then secondly focusing on the opposition to this practice by 
the village priest and the villagers’ response.  This allows me, in the penultimate section, to 
look at how the tensions between the community and the priest, when considered within a 
broader historical and geopolitical context, are fundamental to understanding local identity.  I 
suggest that bi-spirituality is a feature of the (historical) disjuncture between ethnicity and 
territory, as a result of Bulgarian migrants retaining their customs and settling in Russian 
lands where they adopted Russian Orthodoxy. The tensions resulting from this bi-spiritual 
arrangement plays a core role in the construction and management of a local identity. The 
wider significance of this case is addressed in the conclusion: in the context of heightened 
identity concerns – such as in contemporary Ukraine – bi-spirituality is an important means 
of identity management for groups that have no claims of membership based on 
straightforward alignments between ethnicity, territory and religion. 
Village bi-spirituality: religion and customs 
Tensions between the church and local populations are not a new phenomenon – as Chulos 
(2003,55) has shown in the case of Russia. Dvoeverie/double belief is a theme that runs 
through discussions from medieval Russian times to the present (e.g. see Conte [1992]; Levin 
[1993]; Rock [2007]; Vakhtin [2005]).  These debates, in their widest scope, focus on the role 
and influence of Orthodox Christianity with respect to other spiritual practices. The perceived 
opposition between an ‘imperfectly’ adopted Orthodoxy and other forms of spirituality – 
pagan, popular religion etc. – is viewed as a source of hostility and conflict within 
communities (Levin 1993).   
Double belief is understood in various ways. In her meticulous historiography, Rock 
(2007) convincingly shows how scholars have attributed the existence of alternate spiritual 
practices - frequently and sometimes inaccurately identified as ‘pagan’ - to a number of 
possible factors, including the ‘backwardness and ignorance’ of rural inhabitants or forms of 
resistance by villagers to institutionalised religion. Such explanations – a consequence of the 
imposition of contemporary concepts to other periods in history – are problematic because 
they are based on ideologically-loaded representations of the ‘folk’ and driven by overarching 
nation-building agendas.  As Rock (2007, 157) notes: ‘Every term we use – double-belief, 
pagan survivals […] – is tainted with ideological baggage and prone to conceptual flaws.’ 
Rock’s (2007, 159) critical insights are valuable in revealing how representations of double 
belief systems are academic constructions, often ideologically driven, which serve to 
reinforce stereotypes about the rural ‘Other’, while the terminology masks a range of diverse 
phenomenon and situations.  
Despite such convincing critiques, the issue of religious ‘purity’ remains an ongoing 
interest in academic works discussing contemporary Ukraine. For example, the lack of 
commitment to religion in southern (and eastern) Ukraine is explained away by attributing to 
this region a ‘low level’ of religious culture – partly seen as a result of effective ‘atheist 
propaganda’ (Mitrokhin 2001, 174) – that gives rise to different forms of ‘superstitious 
belief’ (Mitrokhin 2001, 180). Such views are, in my opinion, unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons including: conceptual difficulties in assessing the ‘effectivity’ of propaganda given 
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the possibility of hidden forms of opposition; the fact that low or non-participation in church 
life may be attributable to a wide range of factors; and the difficulty in distinguishing 
between ‘pure’ institutionalised religion and other ‘less pure’ forms. The positionality and 
(ideological) interests of the writer are also crucial considerations.  
Adopting an ethnographic-based approach, which demands exploring bi-spirituality in 
context and from the perspective of those engaged in the practices, provides a different 
platform from which to examine the ‘problem’ of double belief. From this perspective 
debates about the degree and extent of religiosity seem ultimately a futile endeavour, since 
spirituality means different things in different contexts and is, more often than not, a mix of 
(institutionalised) religious practices with other spiritually-based beliefs. By taking into 
account the broader historical, geopolitical and cultural factors that constitute part of the 
setting for spiritual activities, alongside the way in which spirituality is played out in 
everyday life, I suggest that bi-spirituality is a means to manage communal membership on 
multiple levels.  
‘Spirituality’, as used in this paper, is applied in its widest sense to refer to any beliefs 
and practices where some form of ‘other world’ or ‘force’ is implicated. If ‘bi-spirituality’ is 
when ‘two distinct belief systems’ co-exist in the same community (Rock 2007, 160), then 
my use of ‘bi-spirituality’ differs in an important way; I view it as not so much two ‘distinct’ 
belief systems co-existing in the same community, as much as the one system that operates as 
a duality. The difference is subtle but important. In much the same way that the community is 
bi-lingual – an analogy I return to again later in the paper – so bi-spirituality denotes a 
particular way of engaging in the community’s spiritual world. Everyday negotiations 
between two sets of practices – denoted as ‘religion’ and ‘customs’ – constitute the 
community’s spiritual world in totality. Importantly, this distinction is rooted both in 
empirical reality and forms the basis of my analysis. ‘Religion’ is used to refer to 
institutionalised religion –  in the form of the UOC-MP with its long term established roots to 
the ROC – while ‘customs’ are locally specific practices attributed by the community to their 
Bulgarian ancestry.8 These designations are those of the community, that is, they are emic 
terms used by villagers and the priest alike. I use this same terminology to highlight, 
analytically, delineations in the villager’s spiritual world.   
In treating religion and customs as emic terms with analytical value, I take the 
position that the coexistence of customs and religion is not a sign of local ignorance or 
backwardness, nor is it a local attempt to resist institutionalised exploitation or even an 
academic myth (Rock 2007).  Instead, if we understand bi-spirituality in context, as Levin 
[1993] suggests we should, then the bi-spiritual system described below, founded on 
antagonisms in the community, provides a basis for identity and a sense of belonging that 
accommodates and satisfies the community’s particular historical, territorial and ethnic 
alliances.  A spirituality that is divided between religion and customs is founded on the 
villagers’ ability to move between two sets of practices that together constitute their spiritual 
world: between their customary practices drawn from their ethnic (Bulgarian) heritage and 
the practice of institutionalised religion adopted from their host country’s traditions. Such 
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mobility enables villagers to locate themselves in the region and beyond, as a minority group 
in an evolving independent Ukrainian state.   
Before turning to a particular event that serves to highlight the everyday tensions 
resulting from the practice of customs and religion, I would also like to say something about 
customs as a particular form of spiritual practices. I use the word ‘customs’ – rather than folk 
or popular religion or any other myriad number of possible terms – because this is the term 
used by villagers themselves9. They carve up their spiritual world into ‘customs’ and 
‘religion’ (sometimes ‘the church’). Further, customs are not a coherent set of beliefs or 
practices. They are, rather, a collection of apparently ‘fragmented’ activities that are seen as 
part of an ancestral heritage that are said to have a ‘long tradition’ and which villagers trace 
back to their Bulgarian roots. The custom discussed in this study – one of a number of 
practices to which the priest expressed opposition as ‘pagan devilry’ – and which is attributed 
by villagers to their ethnic heritage10, makes use of at least some symbols and activities that 
the church considers its own11.  Indeed, it is this that makes such customs the source of 
conflict between the priest and the rest of the village.    
Under the umbrella of customs, we could also include magic, healing practices and a 
range of other non-institutionalised forms of religion that are performed in the village (all of 
which are referred to locally as ‘customs’ and ‘our tradition’). However, only a proportion of 
these customs are ‘spiritual’ in the sense of appealing to a supernatural or external force from 
another world, and it is only these that the priest has openly criticised.  For the same reason, 
many of the magic and healing practices carried out in the village are also viewed negatively 
by the priest, as are the elderly women who conduct these activities. These practices are not a 
focus here because they are, as Lindquist (2000) notes in her study of such activities in 
Russia, an individual solution to an individual crisis (see also Borowik 2002).  Unlike magic 
and healing practices, the custom discussed in this paper is conducted collectively and 
provides a shared solution to a common problem that faces every household and every 
agricultural cooperative in the village – the need for rain to enable the successful growth of 
crops.  It is the collective nature of the custom that also makes it particularly pertinent for any 
exploration of group identity. 
Praying for rain – paparuda 
The concern for rain in this low-lying land characterised by temperature extremes – very high 
in the summer and very low in the winter – is especially urgent in the late spring and early 
summer months when crops require adequate water.  The dismantling of the Soviet 
collectives and the loss of their irrigation equipment (mostly stolen during the early 2000s) 
has only exacerbated the problem. Little wonder that prayers for rain are an important focus 
of both religious and customary practices in the village.   
I begin with a description of the local custom of praying for rain that takes place every 
year on 15 May. 
Paparuda is the name of a practice that is centred on groups of women entering 
households to sing/pray (villagers used both words interchangeably) for rain.  They carry 
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with them a large cross decorated with branches, leaves and flowers – also called a 
paparuda.12 
In the neighbourhood where I lived, which covered the central part of the village, a 
few groups came out to sing, occasionally overlapping in the route that they took.  I followed 
two groups on the day. One was made up of five school-aged girls (8th grade); they were led 
and organised by Anya, in her official capacity as head of cultural activities for the village, a 
position for which she received a salary from the village Council. The other group – much 
more typical for the event – was comprised of seven pensioner women and friends, all living 
in the same street. They had, for many years come together on this day to participate in the 
custom and clearly enjoyed the event; apart from their genuine desire to pray for rain, it was 
also an empowering experience and one in which they engaged with much enthusiasm. 
While there were some differences in the way in which the two groups practiced the 
custom, these were relatively unimportant (for the purposes of this paper) and both were 
received equally warmly into the households they visited.  On entering the household yard, 
the eldest member of the group who carries the paparuda is encircled by the other women. 
They sing a short song (in Bulgarian) that at regular intervals repeats the words ‘let there be 
rain’, a sentiment echoed at various moments by the householders: ‘dai boze duzd’/God grant 
us rain.  At the end of the song, the householder attaches money to the cross, usually a one, 
two or five UAH note, depending on how much he/she could afford. Householders also give 
flour and whatever other staple products they wish to donate – a few eggs, some feta or fresh 
unsalted cheese, oil or pig fat, and red wine which is poured into empty containers that the 
women carried with them.  In keeping with the central theme of rain and praying for a good 
harvest, the singers were sprayed with water and more was thrown at their feet.  The 
householder then produces a sieve which is rolled along the ground and the final position it 
assumes is said to indicate the sort of year the household could expect: an upturned sieve 
indicates a year of plenty, a sieve on its side would indicate a ‘so-so’ year and a sieve 
downturned indicates a bad year.  Before leaving, the elderly women (unlike the group of 
school girls) were offered a small glass of wine: the same glass was passed around to each in 
turn, who emptied the contents in one swig, before it was refilled and passed to the next 
woman.  Each time before drinking, the woman would raise the glass and toast ‘God grant us 
rain’.   
By early afternoon, having visited approximately 15 households, the women 
completed the ritual by carrying the paparuda to the lake, where they sang, one last time, the 
‘let there be rain’ song, before wading into the water and releasing the paparuda, watching it 
float away. They then retired to the house of one of the women from the group, where they 
reviewed their spoils13 and cooked an improvised feast with the gifted food. They met the 
following Sunday in order to hold a proper feast using the remaining spoils from the day.   
The priest’s objections and the villagers’ views 
The groups were warmly welcomed, not only by individual householders, but also by local 
officials in the village Council and in the agricultural cooperative headquarters, as well as at 
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the kindergarten where the teachers lead out all the children to partake in the custom. There 
was one public figure, however, who did not support the practice and was openly hostile to it: 
the priest, who opposed the custom for two reasons. 
Firstly, the priest objected to the custom because it (mis)used symbols that were 
significant to the Orthodox Church. A woman who was a regular church attender and who 
frowned upon the actions of her peers, clarified the priest’s position: ‘He isn’t’, she told me, 
‘against Bulgarian customs in general, but he doesn’t like the way the cross is used in this 
particular ritual’, thus also emphasising that he is not against all local customs, only particular 
ones. The priest’s view was that people shouldn’t pray to paparuda, as doing so is 
tantamount to praying to the devil.   
According to the elderly women who performed the ritual, in the previous year the 
priest had confiscated their paparuda and refused to give it back to them, when they had 
temporarily left it out on the street while they stepped inside the church to light a candle.  The 
elderly women chuckled when telling me this, adding ‘so we went back home, made another 
one, and continued!’  
At church services in the days that followed paparuda, the priest preached against the 
custom to his small congregation, informing them that a cross is a sacred object and should 
not be thrown into the water.  He continued his crusade against the custom two days later at a 
meeting of village officials, when he scolded the Mayor and told the attending officials that 
paparuda was ‘pagan devilry’. He expressed anger, in particular, at the way the cross was 
used and misused. It was not only that this central symbol of Christianity was ‘thrown into 
the water’ at the end of the day, discarded in a way that seemed sacrilegious to him, but also 
that the women showed a lack of respect towards the cross, as witnessed by the fact that when 
he confiscated the paparuda the previous year, it held so little sacred value for them that 
within a short time the women produced another to replace the first! The priest’s concern, 
therefore, was with the issue of ownership: who had authority over symbols that were linked 
to Christianity. 
A second reason why the priest objected to the custom was because it competed with 
the services he offered. 
In the days following paparuda, the priest told his congregation that if people wanted 
rain, they should come to the church to pray for it, rather than supporting the custom. He 
repeated this message at the meeting of village leaders, informing them that instead of 
supporting paparuda, the cooperative leaders should have helped him, the priest, in his own 
efforts to pray for rain.  He admonished them for not having offered him transport so that he 
could carry out prayers for rain in the agricultural fields. This angered some of the Council 
members who vocally defended the cooperative leaders. The secretary to the Mayor (with 
whom I lived in the village) told me that praying for rain was ‘the priest’s work’ and that the 
agricultural cooperative leaders have ‘far too much to do’ to have to worry about this too. 
The priest was thus attempting to build up his moral authority in public life – after 
decades of absence – by injecting his brand of spirituality into local prayers for rain.  His 
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desire to involve and thereby gain endorsement from officials within the village, and indeed 
beyond14, was a means of not only trying to compete with local practices but also an attempt 
to dislodge the custom from its popularity. 
As for the villagers, many were largely dismissive of the priest’s views; while others 
seemed genuinely mystified by his negative reaction.  When I told my neighbour, for 
example, that in the previous year the priest had confiscated the womens’ paparuda, she 
appeared surprised and asked, thoughtfully ‘now, why would he do that? They [the elderly 
women] are also praying for rain’.  
It is such expressions that reveal the equal value villagers attributed to their own 
rituals, despite being so heavily criticised and negatively valued by the priest.  Paparuda was 
seen as ‘just as good’, that is, just as legitimate and effective, as a prayer from the priest. This 
position was reinforced a couple of times during the day when we visited households during 
paparuda. On both occasions the householder, who happened to be one of the priest’s ardent 
followers, was preparing to leave for the church service ‘to pray for rain’.  Anya reminded the 
householder: ‘we are praying for rain too’, to which the host nodded in agreement, 
confirming the truth of this and welcomed them to continue.   
Notably, while most villagers would verbally acknowledge the equal value of both 
forms of prayer (customary and religious), in practice the vast majority participated in the 
custom but did not take part in religious prayers for rain. Church attendance on the day – as 
throughout most calendar days – consisted of the eight or so elderly women who were the 
priest’s most dedicated followers. 
The attraction of customs and the need for religion  
The ‘revival’ of religion, and reversal of socialist policies that confined religion to private 
spheres of social life, has been well documented across the former socialist states (e.g. see 
Tomka [2011]; Hann [2006]; Mitrokhin [2001]).  However, as has also been well 
documented, ‘revival’ engages a wide range of processes (e.g. Tomka [2002, 483]) and, I 
add, masks a wide range of local and regional variations on these processes. While keeping 
these qualifications in mind, we may also ask why, unlike other examples from the former 
Soviet Union (see Dragadze [1993] for Georgia and other parts of Eurasia), is the reversal of 
the ‘domestification’ of religion in Nagorna so clearly limited in scope?  In other words, why 
do Nagornans continue to give value to their own customs even though it brings them into 
open conflict with the priest?   
To answer this question, we need first to look briefly at the history of the region.  
While I cannot convey here the complexities and richness of this history, there are two points 
I wish to highlight. 
The first point relates to the many powers that have controlled this region at various 
times. The influx of different ethnic groups to this previously sparsely populated area in the 
early nineteenth century was encouraged by the granting of free land allotments which 
incorporated settlers into the expanding Russian Empire (Gitelman 1995). In the case of 
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Nagorna, the population today traces back its ancestry to Bulgarians who fled north to the 
safety of this Russian controlled territory to escape Ottoman rule in Bulgaria. While for most 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the region was part of the Russian empire, Russian 
rule was ‘interrupted’ on several occasions: when the area was incorporated into Romanian 
territory for 19 years – 1859 to 1878 (only being returned to Russia after the Russian-Turkish 
war in 1878); then it became again part of greater Romania between 1918 and 1940; before 
being taken by the Soviet Union briefly in the early period of the Second World War (for one 
year); then lost again to Romania for three years (1941 to 1944); before final victory of the 
Soviet Union against the Germans returned the territory to the USSR, where it remained until 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and Ukraine independence in 1991. 
The details of these changing administrations matter less than the main point: in 
different times in its history, the region has been under various state administrations: Russian, 
Romanian, Soviet and now Ukrainian.  Fluctuating relations between state and local 
communities implied shifting alliances that also influenced local fortunes. In the Nagorna 
case, the ethnic Bulgarian population was viewed, at different times, as untrustworthy 
citizens aligned with the enemy15, and at other times as close allies16. 
The second point worthy of highlighting concerns the Church’s changing position in 
the region during this same period.   
The ROC played an influential role in the history of the region, being the only stable 
institution17 in the earliest days of settlement, when the state’s presence in the new and 
peripheral territory was weak and transitory (Schlegel 2016, 24-30).18  The close association 
between state and Church has important implications because it meant that the ROC’s 
fortunes were closely linked to the waxing and waning fortunes of the Russian empire in the 
region. There are at least two times that the ROC’s role was reduced: firstly, during times of 
Romanian domination (there is some evidence that during the 1930s, at least, Romania tried 
to suppress the role of the ROC19); and secondly, during Soviet times, when the Church was 
largely absent from the everyday life of many villagers, as socialist policies separated the 
Church from the state, resulting in the ‘domestification’ of religion (Dragdze 1993). In the 
case of Nagorna, the Church was restored in 1993 after three decades without a priest or 
functioning place of worship.  It was in this same year that they also received their first of 
five priests, all of whom came and went in relatively quick succession, each not lasting more 
than a year or so.  It was only in 2001 that Priest Kirill (who speaks only Russian) arrived in 
the village and, unlike his predecessors, has remained.   
From the above history, it follows that the priest and Church – as indeed the state – is 
not viewed locally as a permanent fixture; such institutional forces have not endured through 
time, despite ‘endurance’ being an important basis for authority (Steinberg and Wanner 2008: 
16). Theirs is a history of rupture.  Villagers articulate this not so much through emphasising 
the impermanency of the Church in their historical past, but conversely through highlighting 
the consistency of their own traditions. They justify their customs in terms of ‘we have 
always done them in such a way’ and as Anya told the priest when he sought her out to 
criticise her official role in encouraging the paparuda custom amongst the younger 
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generation: ‘these are old traditions which have been practiced for generations’.  Customs are 
seen as old because they connect the community with their Bulgarian heritage. 
The historical impermanency of institutionalised religion in the rural areas suggests 
one reason for the continued importance of customs in Nagorna. Unlike religion, customs 
provide a sense of continuity; they anchor the community to a distant past that refers to their 
Bulgarian roots.20  Given their history of migration – meaning villagers cannot make claims 
of belonging on the basis of their present place of residence – customs provide a much-
needed temporal anchor through ancestral connections to Bulgaria.  
However, it is not only perceived permanency and rootedness in the past that makes 
customs attractive, it is also that they allow a strong sense of communal ‘ownership’. When 
villagers refer to their traditions as ‘ours’ and justify their practices on the grounds that they 
have been performed over many generations, they are also underlying their control over such 
activities, the egalitarian nature of such practices, as well as their common and communal 
ownership.   
It is every member of the community that, potentially at least, can partake in customs 
– every household has the responsibility (and a choice) for carrying out the practice and for 
the details of how it is performed.  Thus, it is up to householders whether they lock their 
doors and do not allow the paparuda singers in, or welcome the groups to come inside. It is 
also for householders to decide how much and what they donate to the singers and whether 
their prayers for rain are carried out through the support of customs or whether they also go 
to pray for rain at church with the Priest. Such decisions, firmly rooted in the control of every 
householder, depend on his/her economic circumstances, commitment to religion/customs 
and so on.  Customs are ‘attractive’ because they are egalitarian, in ‘common ownership’ and 
under the control of every single villager who decides his/her own extent of engagement.21   
Thus, customs empower and provide the community with agency. In this respect, they 
differ from the more hierarchically ordered religious practices that are controlled by the priest 
and indirectly also by the wider institutional structure of which he and the local church are a 
part. 
Both the above factors – continuity with the past and ownership/control – help explain 
why customs are important to the Nagorna community.  They do not, however, explain why, 
given the attraction of customs to villagers, the priest or Church is tolerated or needed at all.  
Why do most villagers – who do not go to church to pray for rain and who uphold their own 
customs – nevertheless acknowledge that there is a ‘place’ for the priest’s prayers too22? 
Since the foundation of the village in 1820, the community has been shaped by many 
cultural influences, but Bulgarian and Russian remain the most prominent. Language 
provides a useful analogy.  Villagers are bilingual and they use language selectively and 
strategically.  Russian is used in all public places or in more formal contexts when guests 
from outside the village are present; for example, at the annual village meeting attended by 
district officials, or at everyday occasions such as when school teachers wish to add an extra 
degree of formality or authority when scolding a misbehaving pupil. Russian is also the 
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language of the Church and of the priest who understands a little Bulgarian but always 
communicates in Russian. Bulgarian, on the other hand, is spoken in all everyday situations 
in public and public locations when there are only village natives present; for example, at 
home, in street conversations between neighbours, in the shops and during the practice of all 
customs.  That is, Bulgarian is spoken with ‘insiders’, and in contexts which are relatively 
more ‘informal’. Villagers navigate between the two languages to signal their read of the 
occasion. 
I suggest that a similar principle operates in terms of spirituality: customs and religion 
are bound together in a complementary relationship.  
‘Customs’ are the ‘language’ of and for ‘insiders’; they are the basis of a spirituality 
that is practiced by and meaningful only to village natives. They refer to, indeed ground, 
identity back to its Bulgarian roots, so defining villagers against other ethnic groups in the 
district that do not have the same traditions. Customs also separate Nagorna from other 
Bulgarian villages in the wider region; no Bulgarian village practices any one custom in 
exactly the same way. Nagornans can and do articulate how their customs differ from the way 
they are practiced in other Bulgarian villages in the vicinity. Thus, customs are a means by 
which one village distinguishes itself from all others.23  
I often heard the priest rationalise his views against the village’s customs in terms of 
the fact that many of the traditions in Nagorna are not practiced in other Bulgarian villages in 
the province. In other words, he argued against the validity of their practices which he said 
could not be ‘Bulgarian’ because other Bulgarians do not practice these customs. However, 
this is precisely what gives Nagorna customs an additional power and attraction, that is, the 
fact that they believe their practices are distinctive to their particular community.  The 
customs practiced in the community are more than just ‘Bulgarian’; they are also ‘Nagornan’.  
Thus, every time the priest argues against customs as ‘not Bulgarian’, he is inadvertently 
reinforcing village boundaries, highlighting the customs’ uniqueness and ongoing relevancy 
as markers that distinguish Nagorna from other ‘Bulgarian’ villages in Ukraine and Bulgaria. 
‘Religion’, on the other hand, provides the basis of a spirituality that speaks to and is 
associated with ‘the outside’ and is used in more formal or institutionalised contexts. Across 
the former socialist states, religion has played an important role in the construction (or 
recovery) of national identity.24 Ukraine, with its multiple faiths, where no one confession 
dominates nationally, faces particular problems in such a nation-building enterprise. While 
internationally the Orthodox Church ‘[…] is organized on a nation-state model, with state 
churches serving a particular nation […]’ (Wanner 2014, 432), the situation in Ukraine is 
more complex. Attempts to create a national Orthodox Church were accelerated with the 
renaming of the ROC to ‘Ukraine Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate’ in 1990. However, 
this served to fragment the Orthodox Church even further and the three main branches today 
(noted in footnote 7) provide a point of orientation for regions within Ukraine on the basis of 
particular historical, cultural and geopolitical traditions.  Religion is regionally demarcated25 
and in turn helps position regions within the nation-state (Wanner 2015, 7). In the east and 
south of the country, where the UOC-MP dominates, there is a strong correlation with 
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Russian speaking areas, which have long historical and cultural connections to Russia, as 
well as pro-Russian political views (see Borowik 2002).  Nagorna falls squarely in line with 
the majority of the rest of south and east Ukraine and this differentiates it from the particular 
form of anti-Russian, ‘pro-nationalism’ advocated in the west of the country. Given the 
highly politicised nature of religion in contemporary Ukraine (exacerbated by the recent and 
ongoing war in the east), where struggles between different branches of Orthodoxy represent 
competing influences in the shaping of a post-Socialist national identity (Batalden 1993), an 
alliance to the UOC-MP locates Nagorna in a particular way vis-à-vis the nation state – 
through its past and ongoing ties to Russia.  The church therefore provides a pathway – a 
‘language’ – which connects Nagorna inhabitants spiritually to the rest of the region and 
other regions with similar religious-political alliances; their identity as Ukrainian citizens is at 
least in part defined in terms of their associations and loyalty to the Russian-leaning branch 
of the Orthodox Church and by implication to its connections to Russia.  
Thus, institutionalised religion provides another dimension to local identity; one that 
integrates villagers within a district, regional, national and even transnational framework. It is 
on this basis that the Church and priest have local relevancy in the community. Priest Kirill 
may be an ‘outsider’ in some senses, however, as a public figure who represents 
institutionalised religion, he is also ‘necessary’ because he binds the community to a wider, 
formalised net of spirituality that connects the village with the other villages in the district - 
all of which are also ROC-MP - and beyond.  Even if villagers are not active supporters of 
the Church through, for example, regular service attendance, there is a place for the Church 
and priest in village life. Association with the UOC-MP provides a degree of regional and 
national legitimation and recognition, giving the community a particular geopolitical and 
cultural location in this ethnically diverse and multi-religious nation-state.26 
Everyday villagers operate within, and negotiate between, two sets of practices that 
together constitute their spiritual world, and both have local value and importance. It is this 
duality that explains the villagers’ apparent lack of concern with the priest’s accusations of 
their ‘devilry’ customs which, like the elderly women practicing paparuda, is often shrugged 
off.  At the same time, it also explains villagers’ ‘need’ for the priest; why they desire to have 
him in the village, despite his opposition to some of their customs. The tensions between 
customs and religion are important – not so much as a form of competition or as posing a 
threat (as the priest perceives the situation) – but as a means to demarcate a boundary 
between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. It is this boundary which plays a crucial role in the 
construction of a local identity.  Bi-spirituality is a basis for a form of belonging to multiple 
groups and places that provides a point of orientation in the district, the region and beyond. 
Conclusion 
Against a historical back drop of the comings and goings of state administrations and empires 
– corresponding to the Orthodox church’s changing level of visibility and prominence – and 
in a community that is part of a newly independent nation-state characterised by considerable 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, identity is a complicated matter.  In this particular 
area of Ukraine, ethnicity and territory do not conveniently converge through ‘religion’, as is 
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seemingly the case in other parts of Ukraine where inhabitants can make autochthonous 
claims to the land.  Instead, a Nagorna identity and spiritual community is constituted out of a 
non-alignment between ethnic ‘roots’ (expressed through customs) and their settlement in a 
particular territory associated with institutionalised religion in the form of the UOC-MP.  It is 
an identity carved from the articulation between religion and customs.  Tensions resulting 
from engagement in these two sets of practices creates a delineation within the spiritual 
community that is the actualisation of two facets of their identity.   
Customs provide a basis for a local and ‘intimate’ spiritual community; 
institutionalised religion offers a spirituality that integrates the community with the ‘outside’.  
Such bi-spirituality allows villagers to navigate between the two on a daily basis. At the same 
time, the tensions that are played out in the village between customs and religion, between 
the villagers and the priest, between insiders and outsiders, between practices that are ‘ours’ 
and ‘theirs’ (respectively), are the means by which the boundary between the two is formed, 
maintained and reinforced.27 Every such struggle only makes more concrete an identity that 
both incorporates institutionalised religion and at the same time limits it in a specifically local 
manner.  In so doing the boundaries that are so fundamental to identities are made and 
reinforced.   
In the same way that the bi-lingual villagers shift between different languages in 
different contexts for different purposes so, I suggest, villagers also navigate deliberately, if 
not strategically, between two sets of practices: with religion and customs used in different 
contexts for different purposes to establish their belonging in a territory to which they have 
no autochthonous claims. As Kollmann (1997) found for the Russian Empire in the 
seventeenth century, so today, language and religion provide an important part of a ‘larger’ 
(i.e. beyond the local community) sense of belonging that, together with specific place, 
provides a foundation for identity.  
Such a bi-spiritual, bi-lingual identity is not only negotiated on a daily basis, it also 
provides a degree of ‘flexibility’; it is a means by which villagers are able to adjust their 
positioning in accordance with changing external circumstances, such as changes in the 
nature of state and religious institutional forces, that provide the overarching conditions of 
their existence. Throughout the history of Nagorna, the community’s spiritual world has been 
reconfigured in different ways, according to circumstances of the time.28  However, in all 
cases, bi-spirituality is a means to ‘manage’, rather than ‘resolve’29 the tensions created 
between the practice of customs and religion.30  It provides a way to employ both customary 
and religious practices in the service of a collective identity.   As with other communities 
(e.g. see Rogers 2008), Nagorna is also constructed on the basis of multiple and often 
contested spiritual activities. The village is not a harmoniously united community, but 
defined in terms of its competing and sometimes apparently contradictory practices. This is 
never so true as today, when bi-spirituality continues to be a way for Nagornans to negotiate 
their specific place in the world, as an ethnic minority, in a newly developing and politically 
unstable Ukrainian state. 
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In concluding, I make no claims that the bi-spiritual based identity described above is 
a universal pattern or characteristic in any way to the Orthodox world. However, I believe the 
case has greater relevance. It is not ethnicity or religiosity per se, but the dynamics between 
these in the context of a new nation-state building enterprise (where there is renewed 
importance on territorial claims) that is crucial.  In cases, such as the one exemplified by the 
Bulgarian minority in Ukraine – where groups can make no identity claims on the basis of 
autochthonous links to the land, and ethnicity, territory and religion do not neatly converge, – 
bi-spirituality becomes an important means to manage identity. Notably, Bulgarians in 
Ukraine are not the only group in such circumstances.  There are also other ethnic minorities 
in Odessa province, and in other parts of Ukraine with similar migratory histories who have 
maintained strong cultural and linguistic links to their places of origin (e.g. Moldovans and 
Gagauz).  In addition, these bi-lingual and bi-spiritual communities bear a striking 
resemblance to those of neighbouring communities in Moldova (see Boneva 2006), a region 
also settled by migratory populations uprooted from their original homelands during Ottoman 
rule in the nineteenth century and accepted into what was, at the time, part of the expanding 
Russian empire. Here too, ethnicity and territory do not neatly align, while the management 
of identity is complicated by demands of the post-Soviet nation-state building project. In such 
cases, bi-spirituality has considerable value.  
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1 For an anthropological overview, see Rogers (2005) and Hann (2006). For a contemporary – i.e. post 
Maidan – Ukraine perspective, see Wanner (2015). 
2 I have carried out a full year’s fieldwork (primarily using participant observation methods) between 2000 
and 2005, and a further month’s fieldwork carried out in 2014.  
3 Such claims mask a greater complexity, with intermarriage relatively common and all incomers required 
to learn the local language and customs in order to attain acceptance in the community. In this way, 
outsiders are incorporated into the community and help reinforce claims of its largely mono-ethnic make-
up. 
4 Over the last two decades Ukrainian has also been taught to the younger generations at school.  
5 I do not explore this association between spirituality and morality, but see Zigon (2011).     
6 Mavrov and Bratkov (n.d.: 8) 
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7 The three branches are: the Ukraine Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) which was granted 
independent status in 1990, although it is strictly still under the jurisdiction of the ROC (Krindatch 2003); 
the Ukraine Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate); and the Ukraine Autocephalous Orthodox Church. 
8 In practice, the spectrum of what constitutes either ‘custom’ and ‘religion’ is far more complicated and 
blurred.   
9 The Bulgarian term used is obichai, that is, ‘customs’, the practice of which are given temporal anchoring 
through being seen as Bulgarian traditsia (tradition). 
10 I am not in a position to prove or disprove this association, nor is this the aim of my study.   
11 For Lindquist (2000, 268), who writes about magic and healing, such practices are a ‘bricolage’ which 
borrow at least partly from symbols over which the Church considers it has a monopoly. See also Borowik 
(2002, 500). 
12 Paparuda is reportedly practiced in various modified forms across the Balkans (Tusa 2014, 29) and 
scholars trace its origins back to Thracian times.   
13 On the occasion I attended, the elderly women collected: 20 kg of flour, 5 litres of red wine, 40 eggs, a 
whole vat of oil and another of pig fat, as well as 8 kg of cheese and 46 UAH (used to buy more alcohol 
and other food supplies). 
14 The priest invited officials from the district capital to come and pray for rain in the village. They 
declined on the grounds that it was not part of their formal state duties. 
15 For example, during the Second World War, as Bulgaria was on the side of Germany and therefore 
against the USSR, ethnic Bulgarians – including from Nagorna – were not trusted to fight on the front 
alongside the Soviet Red Army.  Instead, the men were sent to labour camps. 
16 For example, after the Second World War, when The Republic of Bulgaria was one of the USSR’s 
closest European allies, which had positive repercussions for Bulgarians in the USSR. 
17 Alongside other smaller confessions – Jews; Old Believers, Catholics and Protestants (Schlegel 2016, 
24-30). 
18 Many civil administrative duties, such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages, were carried 
out by the Church rather than the state (Schlegel 2016, 41-42). 
19 See Schlegel (2016). Also, see Livezeanu (1995, 102; 106 [footnote 63]) who indicates that priests were 
involved, through their role as educators, in various nationalisation programmes during the two decades 
that the territory was under Romanian influence. However, the success of any such programmes – 
especially in villages that were not ethnically Moldovan – remains unclear. 
20 Memories of the custom relating to the pre-Soviet period indicate that the custom has changed over time. 
Nevertheless, this does not deter from the overarching perception of the custom as unchanging and 
something they have ‘always’ done. 
21 Dragadze (1993, 150) reminds us that while the domestification of religion may have been driven by 
attempts to limit religious freedoms in public spaces during Soviet times, it had the unintended 
consequence of empowering householders, transferring authority of cosmological practices into the hands 
of ordinary citizens, most of whom were women.   
22 Recall the official’s retort to the priest’s scolding – that it is the priest’s ‘work’ to pray for rain; not the 
responsibility of agricultural cooperative heads. 
23 While I have not carried out fieldwork in other villages, other studies indicate the validity of such an 
interpretation (e.g. see Boneva 2006). The important point is not whether such customs are ‘really’ 
different from the way they are practiced in other Bulgarian villages in Ukraine or Bulgaria, but the fact 
that villagers distinguish themselves on this basis.   
24 Batalden (1993, 7); see also Hann (2006); Steinberg and Wanner (2008); Pelkmans (2009). 
25 Often such a demarcation is at the oblasti (regional) level, but sometimes even at smaller administrative 
units, i.e., raiony (district) (Krindatch 2003, 38; also Mitrokhin 2001, 174). 
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26 Here, the analogy with language reaches its limits.  For while during the Soviet period the Russian 
language became ‘international’ in the sense of being the ‘lingua franca’ within the Soviet Union, the 
Orthodox Church, during the same time, was ‘domesticated’ and banished to the private domain.  Local 
customs suffered no such restrictions; to the contrary, during these same 30 years, local officials gave their 
full backing to customs, such as paparuda. It is now, from this starting position, where customs have 
thrived, that the priest is struggling to regain ground and authority presumably lost over previous Soviet 
decades. 
27 Other dimensions of this relationship – ‘egalitarian vs hierarchical/authoritarian’ and ‘female/elderly vs 
male/young’ - also deserve attention but remain outside the scope of this paper. 
28 For example, during Soviet times villagers travelled to the district capital for important life-cycle 
religious rituals because local services were not possible, while customs expanded their reach for everyday 
occasions through the sponsorship of local officials.   
29 To paraphrase Kollmann (1997, 44). 
30 Conte (1992), writing about the case of rural Russia, also views agency as important in the application of 
different belief systems; see also Vakhtin (2005) for the Russian Artic. 
